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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CARL N. SMITH and,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,

1
1

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No. 880661-CA

vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

]

Priority 14b

Defendant/Respondent.

]

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated, and
Rule 3a, Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, and Section 5 of Article
VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District
Court of Duchesne County, Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1.

Was the defendant unreasonable and arbitrary in its

placement of the road, well-site and storage tanks battery?
2.

Did the Court err in failing to assess damages

based on the highest and best use of the said tract, to-wit,
residential purposes?

3.

Did the Court err in failing to allow plaintiffs

severance damages?
4.

Did the Court err in determining that the tract

taken had a possible residual value of $375 per acre?
5.

Did the Court err in determining the fair market

value of the property based not upon the testimony of the expert
witnesses, but rather by the Court's own adjustment to isolated
comparables referred to by the expert witnesses?
6.

Did the Court err in refusing to allow the

plaintiffs prejudgment interest?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an action by plaintiffs/

appellants for damages sustained when defendant entered upon
plaintiffs' property and constructed a well, well platform, access
road and battery.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

This action was tried without a

jury before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney on April 5 and 6, 1988.
At the conclusion of trial the Court directed that the parties
submit their Closing Arguments in writing, together with a Posttrial Memorandum, which plaintiffs/appellants submitted and served
on April 22, 1988.

Thereafter defendant/respondent served its

Closing Argument and Post-trial Memorandum on May 5, 1988.
Plaintiffs/appellants served their Reply Memorandum thereto on
May 13, 1988.

The Court rendered its Ruling in writing dated June 8,
1988, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment on September 12, 1988.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT;

The Court found that at

the time of defendant's entry the well-site, battery storage tanks
and road had "growing crops" thereon within the meaning of the
applicable lease provision, that the use to which defendant put
the 4.76 acres was of such nature and duration that it rendered
the property unusable to the plaintiffs for agricultural purposes
in the foreseeable future, and that such damage to growing crops
and to the land for agricultural purposes amounted to virtually a
total taking of the property by defendant.

The Court found the

fair market value of the property at the time of defendant's entry
to be $3,750 per acre and found that the property had a "possible"
residual value of $375 per acre, and that therefore the damage to
plaintiffs was $3,375 per acre multiplied by 4.76 acres and
awarded a judgment to the plaintiffs of $16,065.

The Court

further found that because defendant's taking of the well-site,
battery storage tanks and road was for an "uncertain period of
time," and that therefore "damages cannot be measured as of a
certain time or according to certain figures," and accordingly
declined to allow plaintiffs prejudgment interest.

The Court

further declined to allow plaintiffs damages based on a fair
market value for residential purposes as opposed to agricultural
purposes, declined to award plaintiffs severance damages, and

found that defendant's choice of the well-site was "reasonable and
practical" and that defendant acted in "good faith."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs/appellants ("plaintiffs" hereafter) are
owners of the fee interest in the subject parcel of real property
located in Section 25, Township 1 South, Range 4 West, Uintah Base
& Meridian containing 20 acres. (Exhibits 1 & 11, R.608-10)
Respondent/defendant ("defendant" hereafter) is the
lessee of the rights to oil and gas on the subject property as
successor in interest to a lease entered into by plaintiffs'
parents March 29, 1966, and duly recorded in the office of the
Duchesne County Recorder. (Ex. 12, 17 & 19; R.611, 678 & 679)
In mid-August 1983 defendant came upon plaintiffs' land
and installed an oil well, oil well battery and storage tanks
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "well-site") in the
southwest corner of the rectangular tract, building a fifty-foot
wide road as access thereto from a county road which abuts the
property, using 4.76 acres of plaintiffs' land. (Ex. 3; R.201,
198)
The Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining spacing order
required the well in Section 25 to be north of a 660-foot line
parallel to the south section line and east of a 660-foot line
parallel to the west section line unless a variance were obtained
from the Division (R.181).

The latter parallel line demarks the

west boundary of plaintiffs' property. (Ex. 1)

Such a variance

had been applied for on other sites by defendant, but no such
consideration was entertained by it and its agents in this
instance, and defendant made preliminary efforts at locating the
well on land to the south of plaintiffs on property owned by the
Duchesne County School Board, but abandoned that effort and
elected to drill on plaintiffs1 land. (R.185-88)

Defendant's

managing engineer, Edward Whicker, testified that in addition to
the school property on the south, as far as the spacing order was
concerned, the well could also have been located on the Taylor
property to the east of plaintiffs and could, with a variance,
have been located on the Leonard Wall property to the west of
plaintiffs' land. (R.183-4)
Defendant fenced the east border of the access road and
the north and east borders of the well-site (the transcript says
"trenched," rather than "fenced," but the context demands—and the
actual testimony was "fenced"). (R.199)

Sometime in 1985 the

fence on the east border of the well-site was shifted to the west
after defendant covered its drilling pit, exposing approximately
1.3 9 acres of land. (R.706)

The surface was never restored by

defendant as defendant's agent, Whicker, himself admitted, and he
opined that it would not be restored until defendant had abandoned
the well and the site was "reclaimed." (R.200)

When plaintiff,

Carl Smith, was asked if the exposed land was restored to its
original condition since the removal of the fence, he answered,
"Far from that." (R.630)

In May 1983 defendant hired James Curtis to make an
appraisal of the 20-acre parcel and provided him a metes and
bounds description of the 4.76-acre parcel in the very location
where the well was ultimately located from which to do his
computations. (R.300)

Curtis1 appraisal was submitted by Whicker

to plaintiffs with defendant's first, and what proved to be its
only, offer of payment for damages sometime in the month of July
1983. (R.732)
Also, in July Whicker met with plaintiffs on the subject
property, and Whicker showed plaintiffs where the well was to go.
(R.227-8)

Whicker admitted that location had been predetermined

by himself and his boss, Bob Lewis, one of the owners of the
defendant, Linmar, when they flew over the location sometime prior
to the meeting between Whicker and Smith in July 1983. (R.289)
Defendant refused to vary therefrom notwithstanding strenuous
objections from plaintiffs.

Both parties agree that in that

conversation plaintiffs told defendant that the proposed well and
road "shattered his dreams," which were to subdivide the property
for his retirement when he retired and returned to Utah. (R.616)
In that meeting all parties also agreed that plaintiffs asked to
have the well located on someone else's land or to provide access
to the well in the southwest corner over the Wall property from
the west (R.617) or to provide access to the well from the
Altamont City street that abutted on the Taylor property to the
east. (R.620)

These requests were refused by Whicker, who

asserted that the defendant would put the well where they chose
and that Smith had no right or opportunity to modify. (R.619)
Whicker1s other alleged reasons for refusing the alternate
locations and alternate roadways were: first, he preferred to deal
only with one landowner (R.187)f second, the Taylor property was
"Indian land (R.618), which Whicker at trial acknowledged was not
the fact even though he so represented to plaintiffs (R.222-4),
third, that the Wall property was uniformly too wet to build an
access road across although the distance would have been half that
of the length of the road installed over plaintiffs1 property,
(R.194) but when interrogated by the Court, Whicker reluctantly
admitted that even over the wet Wall property, the actual cost of
a road so constructed would be approximately equal to what
defendant did in fact spend on the road so constructed on
plaintiffs' property.

(R.262-3)

Whicker, himself, disqualified

himself from being able to make any actual estimates for the cost
of a road short of actually installing it in the following
language:
"A

We never attempted to build that road.

"Q

So the answer is correct, right?

"A

Right.

"Q

You just abandoned that notion early on?

"A

Yes, we did.

"Q

Was your abandonment of that notion in part because
the school asked you to abandon it?

"A

No. The abandonment was based on our experience
that when you build in a wet location it costs you
a great deal of money.

"Q

But you took no measurements to determine just what
damage.

M

A

The only measurement I know to take is to start
building the roadr and we did not do that.

Q

You can't know in advance of building a road what
it's going to cost or what the expense is, what the
depth of the water or the soil sample or any of
those things that can be done? You don't do thatf
that all happens after you commence the road? Is
that what you are saying?

A

I'm saying we don't do that, that's correct."
(R.221) (Emphasis added.)

it

W

Notwithstanding such a disclaimer as to his ability to
estimate without actually commencing such road construction, he
volunteered to estimate that constructing a road across 660 feet
of the Wall property would cost "two to three times" what the
actual road down the west side of the Smith property did in fact
costs as follows:
"Q

How much more expensive to put the road across the
Wall property?

"A

I would say two to three times what it cost.

"Q

Did you make any estimate?
Did you make an estimate?

"A

I'll make an estimate right now to two to three times.

"Q

Nof I want you to tell me what you didf Mr. Whicker.

"A

I looked at it and I said it's wet and consequently
because it's wet that costs money and we don't want to
built it there.

"Q

The whole nine acres of the Wall property is wet and
we're not going to build. And you didn't bother to make

You are an engineer.

any estimate as to what it would cost more.
"A

I didn't write down a formal list of it.

No I didn't.

"Q

And your real reason was you prefer to deal with one
rather than two owners, right?

"A

That's a reason, that's true.

(R.194)

Production began after the well had been completed in
January 1984.

Defendant commenced paying royalties to plaintiffs

and the other mineral owners in that section in the month of
February 1984, and they continued through March 1986. (Ex. 5;
R.201-2)

Plaintiffs have received nothing further from March

1986 to the present time, either for oil or natural gas. (Ex. 4 &
5; R.205, 628)

In one of the four tanks constituting the battery

on the well-site, defendant stored diesel fuel for the purpose of
running the pumps, not only on the well-site, but other pumps on
wells throughout the Altamont oil field (R.215), notwithstanding
there is no such authority to store diesel fuel on the premises
within the terms of the lease.

(Ex. 12; R.279)

It is necessary here to state that at the commencement
of trial plaintiffs' counsel advised the Court and counsel that it
was calling Mr. Curtis, not to be bound by his appraisal, but as
evidence regarding the fair dealing, or lack thereof, on the part
of defendant in trying to cause the least injury to the surface
rights as mandated by the case of Flying Diamond v. Rust, 551 P2d
509 (Utah 1976).

The Court repeatedly disallowed Curtis's

appraisal and testimony regarding defendant's offer to plaintiffs,
notwithstanding such proposed evidence's direct bearing on the

conduct of the parties.

In that connection plaintiffs1 counsel

also took exception to the fact that until four days before trial
defendant had advised plaintiffs that it would use two appraisers,
James Curtis and Howard R. Carroll.

Then on the eve of trial,

defendant advised that it would not use Curtis1s appraisal.
(R.132)

When it came time to tender Curtis1s testimony and to

ask for his written appraisal, the Court sustained defendant's
objection and allowed in only the comparable sales data, giving
rise to Mr. Curtis's opinion, and refused any evidence either from
that witness or subsequent witnesses as to any dealings with
regard to defendant's actual offer to the plaintiffs on the
supposed grounds that offers in settlement are not admissible.
(R.302-8, 321, 592-7)

Accordingly plaintiffs were prevented from

fully developing their theory of the case.
Some evidence about good faith dealings in considering
alternate locations, both for the well-site and the? access road,
was in fact introduced, together with some evidence about
defendant's bad faith in negotiating.

But because of the above-

noted rulings of the Court plaintiffs were in great measure
neutralized in presenting evidence supporting their theory of the
case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I .

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S

FINDING NO. 5 THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF SAID WELL-SITE WAS
REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND THAT DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT'S AGENT

WITH PLAINTIFFS WERE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH.
Flying Diamond v. Rust, supra, requires a balancing of
interests between the rights of the surface owner and the mineral
owner, and the mineral owner, in extracting oil from real
property, must do so consistent with allowing the fee owner the
greatest possible use of his property consistent therewith, even
at additional expense to the mineral owner.
In this case the defendant oil company violated its
duties under Flying Diamond and refused to reasonably accommodate
the surface owners in their desire to use the property for
residential purposes, and accordingly under Flying Diamond is
liable to plaintiffs for damages caused to plaintiffs1 property by
the actions of the defendant.
POINT II.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES

BASED ON THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND LIMITING RECOVERY TO ITS VALUE FOR AGRICULTURAL
PURPOSES.
The highest and best use of the plaintiffs1 property at
the time that defendant entered the property was for residential
purposes, although the property was then being used for
agricultural purposes.

The trial court determined as a legal

matter that he was not permitted to award damages on the basis of
an eminent domain theory, in other words for highest and best use,
but rather was limited to awarding damages for agricultural
purposes only.

Plaintiffs argue that Flying Diamond stands for

the proposition that the surface owner is entitled to compensation
from the mineral owner for the fair market value of the property,
which was an agricultural use, and accordingly in the instant case
is entitled to the fair market value based upon the highest and
best use of the plaintiffs1 property, which was for residential
purposes.

Although in Flying Diamond an additional ground for

compensation was upheld, to-wit, the "growing crops" clause in the
applicable lease, and although the instant case contains a similar
clause and would likewise support damage to growing crops, the
obligation in Flying Diamond was based upon balancing of interests
between the owners of the surface and the minerals, and that duty
applies whether the property is agricultural property or
residential property.
POINT III.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW

PLAINTIFFS SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
Flying Diamond, supra, stands for the proposition that
if the mineral owner violates his duty to reasonably accommodate
the surface owner in extracting minerals from the property, the
owner of the mineral right is liable to the owner of the surface
rights for severance damages.

In the instant case plaintiffs

argue that the defendant violated its duties under Flying Diamond,
that the construction of the well-site and the road substantially
diminished the rest of plaintiffs1 tract for development as a
residential subdivision, and that accordingly defendant is liable
for such severance damages.

POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRACT

TAKEN HAD A POSSIBLE RESIDUAL VALUE OF $327 PER ACRE.
The trial court found that the 4.76 acres taken by the
defendant for the well-site and road were "unusable to plaintiffs
for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future and under the
facts of the case the defendant can in fact hold on the property
indefinitely."

Plaintiffs therefore argue that when the Court

reduced the award to the plaintiffs by a "possible" residual value
which the Court found in the property thus taken in the amount of
$375 per acre, the Court committed error.

It is plaintiffs1

position that the Court could not possible determine that the
property being held by the defendants indefinitely into the future
has any value to the plaintiffs, let alone a value of $375 per
acre, particularly where plaintiffs have no current use whatsoever
of the property in question, and may never have.
POINT V.

THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ARRIVING AT THE

FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY ISOLATING ON TWO SALES
AND THEN MAKING THE COURT'S OWN AJUSTMENT THERETO TO ARRIVE AT THE
COURT'S OWN MARKET VALUE INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE FROM ANY OF THE
OPINIONS OR EVIDENCE SUMMARIZED BY THE APPRAISERS.
Plaintiffs argue here that the Court had a duty to
consider all evidence on the question of fair market value and to
make a determination of fair market value, but instead the Court
isolated two comparable sales referred to by the expert witnesses,
to which the Court made some adjustments as though the Court were

the expert witness, and then in effect adopted its own
"testimony," thus committing reversible error.
POINT VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW

PLAINTIFFS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
The trial courtf although awarding damages to the
plaintiffs of $16,065f refused to award any interest to the
plaintiffs between the time of the taking in 1983 and the time of
the Court's decision in 1988.

The Court based its refusal upon

the ground that "damages cannot be measured as of a certain time
or according to certain figures."

Plaintiffs argued that the

Court misinterpreted ruling case law in Utah, to-witf Bjork v.
April Industries, Inc.f 560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977), and cases therein
cited.

Plaintiffs argue that under prevailing case law plaintiffs

are entitled to interest, although the amount of dctmages is
unliquidated, if the damages are complete as of a certain time and
can be measured by some available standard.

The daimages were

complete as of the time of taking in 1983, and the standard is
fair market value.

Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the Court

committed error in refusing to allow interest.

Plaintiffs further

argue that the interest rate of 10% should apply.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURTfS

FINDING NO. 5 THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF SAID WELL-SITE WAS
REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND THAT DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT'S AGENT
WITH PLAINTIFFS WERE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH.

The law which plaintiffs believe governs this case was
set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah in 1976 in Flying Diamond
v. Rust, supra.

Flying Diamond was the oil- right lessee, and

defendant Rust the surface owner.

In that case the oil-right

lessee took the position that its estate was dominant over the
surface owner and that it had the right to make any use of the
surface which it desired in extracting oil from the property.

In

furtherance thereof Flying Diamond refused the entreaties of the
land owner as to the location of the road to the well-site and
built the same in the location which was most advantageous (least
expensive) to it without any regard to the uses the surface owner
desired to make of his property.

The Supreme Court held that the

Flying Diamond had a right to use the surface to the extent
"reasonably necessary" to extract oil, but the court stated that
this right is limited in that the mineral owner may exercise it
only as "reasonably necessary" and that such use must be
"consistent with allowing the fee owner the greatest possible use
of his property consistent therewith."

The court further stated

that the mineral owner and the surface owner "each should have the
right to the use and enjoyment of his interest in the property to
the highest degree possible not inconsistent with the rights of
the other."

The court then went on to say that the lessee was not

obliged to use "any possible alternative," but was obliged to use
one which is "reasonable and practical under the circumstances"
even though it cost him more than another alternative.

The

Supreme Court of Utah then held that the lower court was justified
in finding that Flying Diamond had abused its obligations under
the foregoing standard, and was accordingly responsible to the
land owner for damages for the taking of the well-site and road
and for the damages to an additional 15 acres upon which the
irrigation had been impaired by virtue of the unreasonable
location of the road.
Thusf in Flying Diamond the court clearly set out that
the use made of the surface by the mineral owner must involve a
balancing of interests between the surface owner and the mineral
owner.

In other words, the mineral owner is not entitled to the

use of the surface in any manner just because it is cheapest to
him when the damage to the surface owner will be substantial.

The

mineral owner is in other words required to incur additional
expense where a balancing of interests requires that expenditure.
This imposes on the parties a burden to deal fairly with one
another and involves a good faith give and take.

It is then for

the court to determine, in the event of a dispute, where the
proper balance is to be achieved in a given case.
It is plaintiffs' position that from the very beginning
defendant failed to enter into any kind of reasonable negotiation
with the plaintiffs as to the location of the well-site or road.
Defendant came to the plaintiffs in the first place and told
plaintiffs where defendant was going to place the road, and told
plaintiffs that plaintiffs had no right to any input in that

matter. We believe that all reasonable minds must agree that such
conduct does not constitute good faith dealing and does not meet
the standard established in Flying Diamond v. Rust. Accordingly,
the trial court committed manifest error in so finding in its
Finding No. 5f and the decision of the lower court must for that
reason be reversed.
Bad faith in bargaining was clearly evident in the
testimony of defendant's agent, Whicker, and the plaintiffs
regarding their discussions about location of the well-site.
Plaintiffs categorically stated that they were given no choice or
opportunity to have any imput as to the location of the well-site
elsewhere on their property.

Mr. Whicker conceded that he did not

give Mr. Smith such a well-site option, but asserted four years
later that he was willing to install the access road down the east
and along the south border of the subject property, but never so
stated before trial.

Smith in turn denied any offered variance

being made, and moreover his suggestions to locate the well and/or
access road on neighboring land were also refused.

Whicker

corroborates that testimony as noted in the Statement of Facts
above.

Whicker, however, did in one candid moment admit that the

site for the well had been picked in a fly-over of the subject
property some several months before his first conversation with
the plaintiffs when he (Whicker) and his boss then and there
determined the location of the well-site. When the Court
specifically interrogated Whicker as to whether there were

topographical or geological reasons for locating the well-site on
the actual 4.76 acres that were takenf his answer was a waffle,
but he said in effect that they were concerned only about getting
as close to an alleged producing well in the section to the south
and west.

He made no other geological or topographical

indications.

Then in cross-examination with regard to locating

the well off the subject property Whicker went to some length to
point out the supposed swampy conditions on both the Leonard Wall
and the school district propertyf but then again, when being
interrogated by the Court directlyf admitted that bringing a road
in across the Leonard Wall property, half the distance to the
subject parcel, would have costf even across the swampf no more
than the road coming down as it does now from the county road to
the north end of the subject.

This good-faith in dealing issue is

relevent because it places the defendant in the same shoes as
Flying Diamond in the Rust case.

That is, defendant elected where

it would put its well-site and did so without modifying or moving
or changing location to help the plaintiffs or to make such a
location less burdensome on the plaintiffs' planned use of the
property.
It would not appear to be a defense, available to
defendant, that plaintiffs did not specifically ask for a
different location for the road and well-site on the 20-acre
tract, when the defendant mislead the plaintiffs by telling them
that defendant had the right to put the road and well-site

anywhere defendant wanted.

We believe that the mineral owner in

the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust had an affirmative duty to
openly and fairly negotiate and deal in good faith with the
surface owner, to the end that his rights were protected. We
believe this is a duty not unlike that of a fiduciary.

In any

event, it is clear that the mineral owner cannot affirmatively
mislead the uninformed surface owner by telling him he has no
right to any input in the determination of a reasonable location.
From all the evidence, we believe the Court can and must
conclude that the locating of that well-site was a fixed and
accomplished fact prior to any conversations between Whicker and
the plaintiffs. The matter is most directly highlighted by the
proximate final exchange between the parties wherein Mr. Smith
refused to accept Whicker's offer and was asked by Whicker if he
intended to be there with a shotgun to keep defendant off the
property, and the plaintiff's answer was, "No, but I will see you
in court." Then Whickerfs prophecy was made about delay and
economic punishment.
Even Whicker admitted that there was nothing topographically wrong about locating the well-site in the southeast corner
of the subject property where plaintiffs wanted it, only that it
would be further away from the producing well to the south.
Moreover, he rejected the notion of putting the well on the Taylor
parcel just to the east for that reason (and because it was Indian
land) and out of hand rejected the notion of providing access to a

well-site on the southeast of the subject or on the Taylor
property by using the existing city street that abuts the Taylor
property, claiming that there were children playing on the street,
whereas there are numerous children on the county road from which
access to the well-site is now served.

He implied as well that

some permission would be needed from Altamont City, but there was
no evidence submitted by the defendant that any such access would
in any way be interferred with by Altamont City or that Altamont
could so interfere. (R.262, 276-7)
By contrast, the plaintiff and Mr. Palmer both agreed
that the subject parcel would be far less impacted had the wellsite been placed in the southeast corner with the access road
running down the east side.

It would be impacted even less if the

subject well were drilled in the southeast corner and access
permitted from the city street across the Taylor property.
Whicker's only objection to that was that it would require dealing
"with two landowners."

As noted above, Whicker earlier admitted

that he may have said to plaintiffs that the Taylor property was
"Indian ground," and they didn't like dealing with the Indians.
At trial Whicker admitted it was not Indian land. (R.222-224)
This lack of good faith in dealing with the surface
owner is also demonstrated in dealings between the parties after
defendant entered the property.

Plaintiff himself testified that

he made good faith efforts to negotiate a settlement in this
matter, only to be met with complete disdain from Mr. Whicker.

(R.626)

That is, Mr. Whicker "promised" him that unless the

offer as extended was takenr the defendant would purposely cause
delay and predicted that the price ultimately awarded to plaintiff
herein would be less than that figure offered by Whicker.

The

plaintiff then said candidly that Whicker's prophecy was halfway
correct, that he certainly has thus far delayed them.
testimony was not denied by Whicker.

That

In fact he said he didn't

actually remember so stating, but said he might very well have so
stated.

The specific testimony of Mr. Smith is as follows:

"Q

. . . When was the next such conversation that you can
recall?

"A

I don't remember every one the exact time, but I do
remember just prior to them moving the rig on my
property he did call me and wanted to know if I would
accept the offer, and I told him no. He strongly
encouraged me to accept that offer, and I still wouldn't
do it. I said, 'I do not want you on my property.1
And he said at that time, 'Are you going to come out
with a shotgun and stand at the gate and keep me from
your property?'
I said, 'No.
in court.'

If you come on my property I'll see you

"Q

What was his response to that?

"A

He indicated to me that that would not be a wise choice,
that if we took this to court that it would be drug out
through a number of years, it would cost me much money
and legal fees, and in the long run I would still
receive less money. He has been partially right in
dragging it out and the legal fees. I'm hoping he is
not partially right in the other part.

"Q

Did he ever at either of those conversations make any
reference to who had the right to put the well site
where —

"A

In my opinion

Mr. Adkins:

—

Objection.

"Q

(By Mr. Madsen) I don't want your opinion. Did he say
anything to you that would suggest who had the right to
put the well site there?

"A

Yes. Because of the oil lease that my mother had signed
he had the right to enter my property and put an oil rig
anywhere that he desired.

W

Did he suggest to you that you had any say there in that
matter?

Q

"A

I was not aware of any such privileges."

(R.627-8)

When Whicker was asked about the same conversations the
questions and responses were as follows:
M

Q

Now, then, calling your attention to the last two things
that you said to Mr. Smith in that final conversation
when he told you he wasn't willing to take your offer
and that he would see you in court, do you recall
telling him that that was an unfortunate decision
because, first, you could delay it, and second, because
he would wind up receiving less than you had last
offered to pay him? Do you remeber that conversation?

"A

No.

I do not.

W

Q

Do you deny that it happened?

W

A

I have no record of it.
substantiate it.

W

Q

You have no recollection? You're saying you don't
remember it, not that it didn't happen; is that correct?

W

A

I frankly don't believe I would say that, but I have no
recollection." (R.225-6)

I have no way to deny it or

This same course of dealings is obvious from the fact
that, having gotten an appraisal from Mr. Curtis, defendant (only
a matter of days before trial) notified counsel for plaintiffs
that defendant refused to use Mr. Curtis, and instead put on Mr.

Carrollf who used the Curtis comparable material and came in at an
appraisal one-half of that given by Mr. Curtis.

It is almost as

though defendant said to plaintiffs that "since you wouldn't take
our offer, we will now punish you by finding an appraiser willing
to come in at one-half the figure we have been offering these last
four years."

It not only impeaches Mr. Carroll to use the same

comparable material and come in four years later with a figure 50%
below, but it shows as well a calculated effort on the part of
defendant to fulfill the other half of Mr. Whicker1s prophecy, and
clearly demonstrates bad faith and a clear violation of lessee's
duties under Flying Diamond.
POINT II.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES

BASED ON THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND LIMITING RECOVERY TO ITS VALUE FOR AGRICULTURAL
PURPOSES.
Regarding highest and best use, Mr. Richard Palmer (on
behalf of plaintiffs), whose qualifications were stipulated to
(R.347) (unlike Mr. Carroll's), testified that not only utilizing
the Curtis comparables, but other sales he examined in the County
Recorder's office (R.360) and in Mr. Snow's office and in other
real estate offices and in discussions with appraisers, people in
Altamont City government (R.350-51) and in Duchesne County
government (R.356), and utilizing his experience in having given
appraisals, all over the state (but in particular in the Uintah
Basin) (R.348) and reasonably close to this same time period in

1982 and 1983, he concluded that the Curtis comparables were
directly related (R.360-61) and that the other sales were not
nearly so related or comparable.

He then determined that the four

sales of the one parcel referred to by Mr. Carroll were of no use
in arriving at value for the subject property. (R.489-90)

He

corroborated Mr. Curtis1s approach that small parcels sell for
more per acre than large parcels, and hence the 4.76 acres was to
be compared with other parcels of the same or approximately the
same size, and that the total acreage should be compared to larger
parcel sales in the vicinity. (R.369-71)

He then indicated (as

Mr. Curtis had to some extent done) that he made extensive
investigation about the possibilities of annexing the subject
property to Altamont City or subdividing in Duchesne County,
moratorium notwithstanding.

Altamont was welcoming annexations

and participating in payment of part or all of the utilities
installation costs. (R.350-54)

He concluded that the highest and

best use, particularly in view of the fact of the close proximity
and availability of all utilities, was for subdivision purposes
and not for agricultural use. (R.354)

It is significant that Mr.

Curtis came to the same conclusion, but discounted or disregarded
it purely because of the moratorium without doing any further
investigation along those lines and also because he claimed no
expertise in fixing severance damages. (R.310-11, 318-20)
Defendant's last-minute appraiser, Howard R. Carroll,
destroyed his own credibility in several particulars.

First, his

very appraisal, admitted over objection (R.407), and all of the
language therein, treated developments in Duchesne County
following the acquisition date, all of which is precluded from the
normal appraisal because it has to be couched in language of what
a willing buyer will pay at that time, being informed of all of
the available uses of the property and of all of the factors
influencing value, in short, being fully informed at that time.
The willing buyer is not permitted to be blessed with 20/20
hindsight, and Mr. Carroll's hindsight permeates and destroys his
appraisal. (R.380, 391, 393-407)
Mr. Carroll asserted that there was no severance damage,
and that was because he took the view that the highest and best
use was agricultural and that the property could still be used for
agriculture, and that there had been no impact upon the
agricultural use by virtue of the well-site and road. (R.404-5)
Plaintiffs submit that such an argument, along with the
rest of Mr. Carroll's testimony, is incredible and not entitled to
credence, both because of his admitted reliance on hindsight and
because of his groundless unwillingness to even consider the
subject property as being developable as subdivision property as
of August 1983.

Since he refused to consider that possibility, he

is hardly a competent witness as to what severance damages would
have flowed from such a determination of highest and best use.
It is significant that Mr. Curtis (whose appraisal was
done at the time of the taking) and Mr. Palmer each considered

residential development, and that Mr. Palmer, upon doing a
thorough analysis, determined that such a possiblity was indeed
not only possible, but likely, and that a willing, uncompelled
buyer would consider that use in determining the amount such buyer
would pay for the property.
As noted above, in Flying Diamond v. Rust, the court
held that since the owner of the mineral interest had failed to
utilize a reasonable alternative, he was liable for destruction of
the well-site and road and also for the partial destruction of an
additional 15 acres.
Although the court talks in terms of failure of the
mineral owner to use a "reasonable alternative," it appears that
that test is directed more at the partial destruction to the 15
acres than to the total destruction of the well-site and road
because, even if Flying Diamond had selected the reasonable
alternative, the well-site and road would presumably have been
installed, and yet the court in that case did not for that reason
decline to compensate the land owner for the taking of the road
and well-site.
In other words, although the Supreme Court talks in
terms of reasonable alternatives, it appears that the court in
effect held that where the extraction of minerals requires a
substantially complete taking of part of the surface, the surface
owner is entitled to compensation therefor, irrespective of good
faith or balancing of interests.

In so holding, we believe that

the Supreme Court acknowledged that, although there may have been
justification for allowing the mineral owner to destroy the
surface in times past when land was cheap, society has left that
era and the courts must acknowledge the legitimate interests of
surface owners, and that compensation be paid to the surface owner
where the extraction of minerals destroys the surface.
It should be noted that in the Flying Diamond case,
Flying Diamond was not given a "credit" for not using the road it
presumably could have used, but didn't.
Defendant's bad faith brings this case squarely within
Flying Diamond, but even if that were not so, plaintiffs believe,
and would urge this court to adopt the view, that where the
mineral owner destroys the surface, he must pay the surface owner
the reasonable value thereof for the highest and best use of the
surface, whether for agricultural purposes, for residential
purposes, or whatever the highest and best use may be.
We believe that another aspect of the Flying Diamond
case supports the foregoing.

In that case the court determined as

an additional basis for sustaining the lower court that the
mineral lease provided that the owner of the mineral interest was
required to pay the surface owner for damage to "growing crops."
The court held that "growing crops" included "any useful product
of land whether sown or occurring naturally."

The discussion of

crops in Flying Diamond occurred after the court determined that
Flying Diamond was liable for the taking of the well-site and

roadf and the ruling with regard to crops was thus an additional
ground in support of the ruling of the lower court.

In Flying

Diamond the highest and best use of the land in question was
agricultural, and therefore the discussion with regard to crops
could be given a literal interpretation.

We believe, however,

that the discussion of the court was not intended to be so limited
and that in effect the court in its discussion of growing crops is
setting forth in another form the principle that the mineral owner
is required to compensate the surface owner for any substantially
total taking of surface rights, whether the land be agricultural
or otherwise, and that the measure of compensation to be paid is
the fair market value of the land for whatever its highest and
best use may be.
It is plaintiffs' position that the Flying Diamond case
established the principle that the owner of the mineral estate is
liable for the area of the surface taken for well cind road where
that use amounts to substantially a total taking of the property
and that the damages recoverable by the owner of the surface right
are based upon the highest and best use of the tract.

In the

Flying Diamond case the highest and best use of the property taken
was for agricultural purposes, but in the instant case the highest
and best use of the property taken by the defendant was for
residential purposes, and under the authority of Flying Diamond
plaintiffs were entitled to be awarded damages based on the value
of the property for residential purposes.

It is submitted that the evidence requires a finding
that the highest and best use was for residential purposesf but
even if the fact finder were free to choose betweem residential
purposes and agricultural purposes, the lower court in effect
ruled as a matter of law that it could not consider highest and
best use, but only the agricultural use to which the property was
being used at the time of the taking.
and No. 12.)

(See Findings of Fact No. 4

Had the Court felt that it could use the "theory of

eminent domain," in other words highest and best use, it very
likely would have found that the highest and best use was for
residential purposes. This appears to be borne out by the fact
that the Court in Finding of Fact No. 8 speaks of proximity to
Altamont as enhancing the value of this tract, and that
consideration is far more applicable to residential property than
to agricultural land.

Being near to Altamont does not enhance the

crop any, but makes a big difference for residential purposes.
The Court in the Flying Diamond case, in adopting its
balancing of interests doctrine, which is not dependent on
contract, was in effect acknowledging the same policy that has
been enacted into law by our legislature in the realm of eminent
domain.

See Section 78-34-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:

"In all cases where land is required for public
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such use may
survey and locate the same; but it must be located in
the manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury, ... "
(Emphasis added.)

We note also in passing that use of the power of eminent
domain is available to oil companies in the course of developing
their mineral interests, and that indeed Mr. Whicker threatened
the use of condemnation in this case if Mr. Smith were unwilling
to allow them on his land to put in their well site.
POINT III.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW

PLAINTIFFS SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
What Flying Diamond v. Rust stands for, we think, is
that when the lessee of the mineral interest is reasonable in his
use of the surface and takes reasonable steps to accommodate the
surface owner, then he must compensate the surface owner for
direct damage done to land.

If, however, the mineral owner does

not reasonably accommodate the surface owner, then he is liable
not only for such direct damage, but in addition for all damages
which flow from his conduct, including the area taken and areas
suffering consequential or severance damage.
We urge this Court to adopt the rationale of the
Memorandum Decision in Flying Diamond v. Rust (Exhibit 23) wherein
Judge Bullock said in the final sentence of paragraph 4:
"The use of the land taken by the plaintiff for the
well-site and the road is effectively and permanently
denied to the surface owner for any use theretofore made
of the land, and the Court holds that such damage is the
fair market value of the land at the time it was taken .
it

* .

In the Flying Diamond v. Rust case the last paragraph,
alludes to the case of Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colorado
535, 413 P2d 190 (1966).

The Frankfort case appears to hold that

mere depreciation to the surviving or remaining land of the
surface-owner was not compensable, but only the land actually
taken.

In his opinion, concurring in result, but otherwise

dissenting, Justice Frantz puts the whole matter succinctly this
way:
"Although I concur in the result reached by the
majority, I would confine the holding of the case to its
particular fact.
"The main question presented on this writ is
whether or not depreciation to surrounding land caused
simply by the presence of well-head or a similar
installation is compensable under paragraph 11 of the
Colorado Oil & Gas Lease operative in this case. I
agree it is not, but would go no further than that.
"The court goes far beyond this with his language.
It holds 'that land damages are limited to the surface
used by Frankfurt only . . . ' (emphasis supplied),
never defining what is meant by the term 'used1 other
than to later refer to the 'operations specified' and
the 'actual authorized operations on the land.'
"'Use1 is a relative term. The majority claims it
has so used it, but this is too subtle a reading of its
remark for me to comprehend. It should specifically be
understood by those who would look to this case as
authority that it in fact holds only that mere presence
on part of leased land is not necessarily a use of the
remainder. Other 'operations,' as that term appears in
the lease, could be a partial taking and, therefore, a
compensable use."
The dissenting opinion thus urges the need for a
thorough and thoughtful analysis of the term "use" in the light of
the facts of the given case.

When Justice Crockett in Flying

Diamond says that, "We see no reason to disagree with the holding
of the Frankfort case," he is not simply saying that severance

damages are not proper as to cases where the mineral owner has not
acted in good faith—he is saying just the reverse.
In fact, it appears that our court reaches the same
result urged by the dissent in Frankfort, by a slightly different
route.

Our Court seeks to solve the problem by requiring a

balancing of interest, and the dissent in Frankfort would perhaps
solve it by a broad interpretation of the idea of '"use."

In any

event, the oil company abused its responsibility in Flying Diamond
as it did in this case, and Justice Crockett's analysis applies:
"Our interest is in the essential fact as to what
was done. When viewed in that light, it is apparent
that the trial court found that because of the placement
and manner of construction of the plaintiff road,
preventing irrigation of 15 acres of the defendant's
land, its usefulness and value were diminished to the
extent of $750 per acre. Applying the standard rule of
indulging the presumptions of verity to the findings and
judgment of the trial court, we are not persuaded that
they should be disturbed." (Emphasis added.)
Had defendant in this instance placed the well in the
southeast corner of the plaintiffs' property and provided access
through the existing road and across the Taylor parcel, for
example, it would have been done with the least private injury and
whatever resulting damages the remaining property sustained might
have been noncompensable.

Here, however, because defendant

arbitrarily placed the road and well-site where it did, it didn't
result in the least injury of the surface owner, but rather the
most, and defendant thereby becomes liable just as in Flying
Diamond v. Rust, and our Supreme Court there held that the
diminution in value of the 15 acres so affected by the placement

of the Flying Diamond road was upheld as compensable damages.
Here, by placing the road down the west side and establishing the
well-site in the southwest corner, the remaining parcel of 15.24
acres has been damaged, and said damage, by virtue of defendant's
arbitrary placement, is compensable.
Palmer testified that the before value was $2,500 per
acre and that the remaining 15.24-acre parcel suffered a 25%
diminution in value by virtue of the taking of the 4.76 acres, as
it was and where it was, destroyed or seriously impeded
subdividing as a possibility and that, while it may still be
subdividable, there would have to be that kind of diminution in
the price in order to attract buyers had the property been
subdivided the day after the well-site had been installed.

Palmer

further testified, as did plaintiff, that had the well-site been
located in the southeast corner with the road running down the
east property line, the impact would have been far less.
Plaintiff added that he would have then been able to subdivide in
connection with his uncle and cousin, a viable possibility which
had only been discussed prior to the coming of the well-site, but
is now precluded by its existence.
Thus, we submit

Flying Diamond v. Rust stands for the

proposition that the surface owner is entitled to compensation for
the land taken for wellsite and road under the general principles
governing the rights between the owner of the surface and the
mineral estate, also on the strength of the crop clause in the

lease.

The case as there noted also stands for the proposition

that where the owner of the mineral interest does not reasonably
accommodate the surface owner, then he is liable—not only for the
land taken for road and wellsite—but for all damages which flow
from his conduct, including the area taken and areas suffering
consequential or severance damage, and the measure of damages in
determining severance damages, as well as the damage for the land
actually taken, is the highest and best use as noted under Point
II.
In its Findings the Court excluded any consideration of
severance damages as to reasonable uses by limiting his
consideration to agricultural use only, and in so ruling committed
reversible error.

The record contained ample testimony to support

severance damages, which the Court obviously did not consider, and
the lower court's ruling on severance damages should be reversed
and the matter remanded for the Court to make findings as to the
amount of severance damages.
POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRACT

TAKEN HAD A POSSIBLE RESIDUAL VALUE OF $327 PER ACRE.
In its Finding of Fact No. 8 the Court stated, among
other things:
"The court further finds that the property has some
possible residual value to plaintiffs (hereinafter
referred to as "residual value"), which the court finds
to be $375 per acre."

The Court further found in paragraph 6 of its Findings
with respect to the property taken that:
"The said use to which defendant has put the wellsite is of such nature and duration that it is rendered
unusable to plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the
foreseeable future, and such damage to growing crops and
to said land for agricultural purposes amounts to
virtually a total taking of the property by defendant,
and the court finds that the value of such taking by
defendant can most accurately be measured by determining
the fair market value of the well-site and deducting any
residual value to the owner after defendant's use has
ended and the property restored."
It is respectfully submitted that these two findings are
inconsistent.

In paragraph 6 the Court determines that there has

been an absolute taking of the property and inasmuch as it is
unusable for the "foreseeable future."

How the Court can

determine that it has any residual value to the plaintiffs, let
alone $375, when the defendant alone will use the property for the
"foreseeable future" is difficult to imagine.
Plaintiffs cannot use the 4.76 acres for agricultural or
other purposes and will not be able to use it until it is
relinquished by the defendant.
property indefinitely.

Defendant can hold on to the

We believe that the Court has erred in

finding any residual value because the period of time which
plaintiffs will be deprived of the property is perpetual, and
furthermore the plaintiffs are being deprived of all use of that
land during that period of time.

In other words, it might be

proper to determine a residual value if the plaintiffs were
presently being able to make some use of the land.

In the Flying

Diamond case the Court determined that the surface owner's land by
reason of interference with his irrigation system did not result
in a total taking, but only in a diminished value to the land.

It

must, however, be remembered that in the Flying Diamond case the
landowner still was able to use the land, although his use was
substantially diminished.

In the instant case the landowner

cannot use the property taken to the extent of $375 per acre, or
any other amount, in the foreseeable future.

For all the Court is

able to determine when that property is returned to the landowner,
if ever, it won't be worth anything.
We respectfully submit that the Court, under the facts
of this case, is compelled to find that the destruction of the
land taken was total.
Furthermore, it is not proper for the Court to deduct
$375 per acre from the value of the property taken on the basis
that it has a "possible" residual value.

Unless the Court can

determine that it has a "probable" residual value, the Court must
find that the destruction to the land was complete and total.
POINT V.

THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ARRIVING AT THE

FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY ISOLATING ON TWO SALES
AND THEN MAKING THE COURT'S OWN AJUSTMENT THERETO TO ARRIVE AT THE
COURT'S OWN MARKET VALUE INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE FROM ANY OF THE
OPINIONS OR EVIDENCE SUMMARIZED BY THE APPRAISERS.
Paragraph 6 of the Court's Ruling reads as follows:

"The value of the prope rty at the time the we. 1 •
te was constructed was $3, 750.00 per acre. The most
nparable sales used by the appraisers were the
Cummings/Rule sale, at $3,53 0.00 per acre, and the
Wheeler/Stanley sale at $3,3 00.00 per acre. The subject
property is closer to a town than the comparables, thus
justifying a higher value, The property has some
possible residual value to P laintiffs, which the court
determines to be $375.00 per acre. The court finds that
despite good faith effort by Defendant, the 1.3 9 acre
parcel has not been restored , and Plaintiffs1 damages
continue. Thus, Plaintiffs are awarded damages as
follows:
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generally, and the following two instructions have to do with
experts using comparable sales, and as the court can readily
observe, use of specific comparable sales as referred to in each
of those instructions may be used "only for the purpose of
determining what weight, if any, you accorded to the testimony of
any of the expert witnesses in his ultimate opinion as to the fair
market value of the land in question."

(Emphasis added)

Or "such

sales form a basis for the opinion regarding value of the witness
relying thereon, but such sales, though reasonably comparable, are
not to be considered as the sole test of fair market value
herein." (Emphasis added.)
In short, had a jury returned with a verdict form on
which it had written the same wording as appears in paragraph 6 of
the Court's Ruling, the jury would have committed reversible error
and would have in fact failed to follow the Court's instructions.
It is patently clear, therefore, that the judge as fact finder
cannot do what a jury would be precluded from doing.

To isolate

two sales and then apply the Court's own adjustments thereon to
arrive at an opinion as to the market value of the subject
property is to convert the fact finder (the judge in this
instance) into being the expert witness—the sole expert witness-in total disregard of all the other relevant evidence.
conduct by the Court herein is therefore patent error.
POINT VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW

PLAINTIFFS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
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i_ held t- •* **- damage - :: property is fixed in time and

also there is a known standard of value available to the fact
finder, and therefore prejudgment interest should be awarded.

The

court said at page 111:
"The true test to be applied as to whether interest
should be allowed before judgment in a given case or not
is, therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidated
or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a
particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of
evidence and known standards of value, which the court
or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to
be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for
elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards
of value. The same rule under the same conditions would
of necessity apply to actions for breach of contract."
(Emphasis added.)
In the Uinta

case the court quoted at length from the

Fell case and ruled:
"There can be no question about the propriety of
allowing interest for the destruction of personal
property prior to judgment where value can be measured
by facts and figures."
It is evident then that "facts and figures" are the
equivalent of "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value."
The Uinta

case refers to Railroad v. Board of

Education, 35 Ut 13, 99 P 263 (1909), where the court held that
interest was appropriate in a condemnation case, and this prior to
enactment of the statute allowing interest in condemnation cases.
The court there held that interest was allowable whether the
condemnation was viewed as a total taking or merely one involving
a diminution in value, and the court pointed out that interest is

allowable if the d a m a g e s are ascertain ••" "
definite
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f •
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iccordance with some
*" case
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"he cou t seated at

page 24:
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"We, t h e r e f o r e , have a case in w h i c h , for the
purpose of fixing d a m a g e s , the injury is complete;
the damages are ascertained by the ordinary rules of
evidence and according to a known standard or m e a s u r e
of v a l u e . And all of this must be determined from;.
competent e v i d e n c e , which is binding upon both the
court and jury. The jury, therefore, only had a right
to exercise their judgment within the 1 imits of the
evidence upon the question of v a l u e . It is not a case
where it was left to the jury to d e t e r m i n e the amount
of damages from a mere description of the wrong s done
or injuries inflicted w h e t h e r to person,- property or
reputation."
-arson v. State of Utah

the court held

^hat damages, although u n l i q u i d a t e d , were a s c e r t a i n a b l e by
calculate~ v

* • 4-her°f^,r'v prejudgment

inter

damages ™&
^his case

i:-t

. v

:

.U_A, .C ^

,

:~

in. i quidated , * -vertneless fixed a

-

i

certain tt v.* -i -, ^ =^,->^+'=» * -*-*•-' ^ *- arcr^ian ^
_r : :re preijdqm- at
iatar j st s u5.t. . •

-t jva rc:pc! ?c pi 3: n*" . ' :

<\. ~ ; respect

^

"r.cV. m e c^ 1
statute, Sect:.- .

*• r e ^

^

? \:
r

^*

a::er tn^ .uteres':

-in Ocd** Arr:otat.->d , %:-

the legal ; nterest rate from the os i a t ^ to m e
10% per an;- .

<

^+-<^VQ^-

rnanged
r-

raising

I i -

:

It is axiomatic thatf to the extent that the damages are
based upon the principle announced in Flying Diamond v. Rust
relating to unreasonable use of the surface by the mineral owner
that interest would be at the rate prevailing by .statute at the
time of the wrong, which would be the 10% per annum rate.

The

District Court in Flying Diamond allowed the then-prevailing legal
rate of 6% per annum, and that was affirmed on appeal.
Does a different result follow if damages are based upon
the lease and therefore on a contract theory?
that it does.

It would not appear

In the lower court defendant cited the case of SCM

Land v. Watkins, 732 P2d 1051 (Utah 1986) f for the proposition
that damages in this case arise out of a contract which was
executed at a time when the interest rate was 6% and that that
rate prevails although the rate was changed by statute in the
interim.

The case does not stand for that proposition.

In SCM

the lease in question was executed July 9, 1979, almost two years
prior to the change in the statutory interest rate, and it must be
noted that the lease there was breached in April 1981, prior to
the effective date of the rate change, which was May 1981.

Where

the breach occurred prior to the effective date of the rate
change, there can be no question that the interest rate prevailing
at the time of the breach (6% in SCM) would be the proper rate of
interest, and anything stated in SCM in excess of that is purely
dicta and was not necessary to the decision in that case.
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Where the interest rate changes between execution of the
contract and breach, and the interest rate is imposed by statute
and not by contract, the later rate applies.

In Goodfriend v.

Druck, 289 So. 2d 710 (Florida 1974) f a promissory note executed
in 1962 called for 10% per annum interest before maturity and 15%
per annum thereafter.

At issue was the liability of a guarantor,

and by a statute in Florida enacted in 1965 the interest rate
chargeable to the guarantor could not exceed 10% per annum.

The

lower court held that the 1965 statute did not effect the note
execued in 1962.

The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and held

that the later statutory rate prevailed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully
request that this Court reverse the lower court's determination
that the defendant met the requirements of Flying Diamond in
selecting the location of the well-site and road, that the Court
determine that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the
4.76 acres taken, together with severance damages, and that the
Court determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation
for all of the foregoing damages at the highest and best use of
the property, to-wit, residential purposes, that the Court
determine that the property taken by the defendant has no residual
value to plaintiffs of $375 p€>r acre, or of any other sum, and
that the Court determine that plaintiffs are entitled to
prejudment interest at the rate of 10% per annun, and that the
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CARL N. SMITH and,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,

]

Plaintiffs,
)

JUDGMENT

vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

Civil No.85-CV-2D
)

(L^r/h^1-^

Def-jnu-i.it.

v^-^riild nia::er came on for '".rial before the
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of -he above court, sitting
without a jury, on the z*- ^ ; id 6en ?f -•-» i1
were represented by Gordon

./Jf? -

~:' ,m\tffs

Mad sen and Robert C. >"umnu:v:i 3, and

the defendants were represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L,
Christiansen*

The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the

defendant hav1 - -

-^.k. .M evidence, and both sides having rested,

and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the
parties, =ind the 0-H.ir*-, hwir.-r heretof-"w
Fact

a;-^

• ^

„; ~.. ;.

-. ^

j

-• • ^r-i

n.i.^q o f

_ .. /,

NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of Gordon A, Mads^n.arid

^ . fiLED
R o b e r t G . Cummi ng s , a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e D la. i n 11 f f s ,
^

°':' c'st'~,ct c ^rt Duchesne
State o/utaft
S£F

/ 3 19P8

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiffs are hareby awarded judgment against the defendant in
the sum of $16,065, together with interest thereon at the rate of
twelve percent per annum from the. date hereof, together with costs
in the amount of $

DATED the JZ^LL—

.
da

Y

of

^>As^St^^c^4t

1988.

BY THE COURT:

L

DISTRICT JUDGE

1 .;
-L '* -ip

0^ ~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing prcr '•&•'
Judgment was mailed, to Robert W# Adkins and Terry l> Christiansen,
attorneys for defendant, ? . 0. *o.c t ^ , Ccalvilli, Utah
postage prepaid, this

/,.-*

84017,

day cf August., \'*» ; .

/,,,-^s"r^^
Attorney for Plaintiff

—_

FILED
GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
225 South
Salt Lake
Telephone
1W

8th U«::ict Court Duchccr.e
State of Utah

MADSEN, #2048
CUMMINGS, #7 77
for Plaintiffs
200 East, #150
City, Utah 84111
322-1141
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY,

CLERK
, Deputy

STATE OF UTAH

CARL N. SMITH a n d ,
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

Civil No.85-£J£-2D

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1988.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C, Cummings, and
the defendant was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L.
Christiansen.

The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the

defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested,
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the
parties, and the Court, being advised, makes and enters the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

Plaintiffs are, and during all material times were,

owners of a twenty-acre tract of land located adjacent to the city

limits :>'::. the town of Altamont i n Duchesne County described as
follows:
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 cu r!ie Southwest w 4
of Section 23, Township 1 xut'i, Rar^e 4 West, USM.
2.

On or about March 2*,

' <6^, in Oil and Gas Lease

was entered into by Hyrum W. S>r.: th . r. ••.'j.ly M. Smith, hi s wife,
as lessors, and Walter Duncan, as lessee-

Plaintiffs, ... - all

material times, were successors ir interest to said 1 "-c' - =•
1 e s s o r '' s i n t e r e

<. - --. i -'

- to

- i;: J *- a s LJe a s e , an d ^ t- \

ma te r x d ^

times defendant was successor in interest - :> the lessee's interest
in and to said Oil and Gas Lease.
3.

During the month of August 1983 the defendant

entered upon the aforesaid 20-tract and placed in the southwest
corner an oil well, an oil well ba + t^y' -tru ^ornq^ t" nk,^

, i the

same time the defendant constructed an access road from the County
road on the north to the said oil well, oil well battery and
storage tanks, said road running n« * * ^ .* - ; — *•
boundary of said tract.

. *• ./

The oil well, oil well battery, storage

tanks and road occupied 4.76 acres of the said 20-acre tract, and
said 4.76 acres thus occupied by the defendant is here \ 'iaf ter
referred 4.

. : r,: -.veil-site."
At the time of the entry by defendant as aforesaid

the property was being used by piairrci1 ; purposes.

• *,-.

, - .: -~.

5.

The Court finds chat the defendant's choice of said

well-site was reasonable and practical, ana the dealings ot
defendant's agents with plaintiffs were carried out m
6.

good faith.

In paragraph 8 of the said lease it is provided

chat the leasee "shall pay for damage caused by its operations to
growing crops on said land."

The Court finds that the said well-

site had thereon growing crops within the meaning of said lease
provision at the time of said defendant's entry thereon.

The said

use to which defendant has put the well-site is of such nature and
duration that it is rendered unusable to plaintiffs for
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future, and such damage
to growing crops and to said land for agricultural purposes
amounts to virtually a total taking of the property by defendant,
and the Court finds that the value of such taking by defendant can
most accurately be measured by determining the fair market value
of the well-site and deducting any residual value to the landowner
after defendant's use has ended and the property restored.
7.

The Court finds that it would be inequitable (and

contrary to said lease) to allow plaintiffs as damages only the
minimal value of crops grown on the property for a given number of
years, which term cannot now be determined.
3.

The Court finds that the fair market value of the

weil-site at the time defendant entered thereon and construcced
said improvements was $3,750 per acre.

The Court finds that the

most comoarable sales used by tne appraisers were the Cummings/

Rule sale at $3,530 per acre and the Wheeled''-: T '- y -,al'
'I' tie Court uinds chat the sue iect property is
close" tic .1 tTtfn than the comparables, cnus juSuLryi.i^ :u.:rt .l.^ner
value,

The Coj.rt further finds that *,

*

•\

.n :

possible residual value to plaintiffs (nerei-»ai ter referred tc as
$3 7 5 n<^ a " ^ .

"residual v a l u e " ) , which the Court ;:inr<- to ^
9.

The Court

r<:

d

.. ,-u - * .. .

-

t.>j:'; resrora: ion wi ;h i.-gari to 1 „ 3 J? ac^^-i

,

sr

^p-5

J C the sa:d v e , - -

site, tu- "hp Co.::*" njtr-ner finds tha*-. dr^'ice such qccd-laitn
effort by defendant, the •» •

• -

?tj •-.:,

d

plaintiffs' damages with respect thereto continue.
10.

The Court finds that plaintiffs n \v3 003*1 damaged

in the amount oi

th

."] i r'f ^r^n^- *v_:.-,,.-..f>

_ - ,c:rKr, vt.^ue of

$3,750 per acre and the residual value re tre owner of $3':"i per
acre.

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs were damaged in

the amount of $3,3""" 'v*r .i-r.- :' -'-, ' uj per acre fair maricet value
less $375 per acre residual value) multiplied by 4.76 acres,
yielding a total damage to the plaintiffs of
!I.

The Court" na-,

n

;

-u •

'U6,UOJ.UU.

;ierermine the value

of the taking ot the well-site for i-• .-lcertain period of time,
and to fashion an equitable award based thereon, and therefore the
Court finds that damages < . •.-v-r :->-;> measured
or a* -:-,: .:

- , .

certain t i me

h

o certain figures, and therefore the Court finds

that plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment

interest.

1

JL.

-4-

'-:•-

U JL

12.

The Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to

damages on their theory of eminent domain, but are only entitled
to be compensated for damage on the property used by defendant for
its well-site for agricultural purposes as heretofore found by the
Court.
13.

The Court further determines that there is no

evidence that the defendant's use of the well-site adversely
affected the agricultural use of the remainder of plaintiffs'
property, and finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to severance
damages.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW:
1.

Plaintiffs are entitled no judgment against

the defendant in the sum of $16,065 (based upon the virtual
destruction of the property for agricultural purposes, and that
the measure of such damages is the difference between the fair
market value of the well-site at the time of defendant's entry and
the aforesaid residual value), together with interest thereon at
the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date hereof.
2.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on any

eminent domain theory, nor are plaintiffs entitled to severance
damages.
3.
interest.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment

4.

Plaintiffs

DATED the

^'""^

are e n t i t l e d

to c o s t s .

d a y of ,<J(&t2/3>,

^ l ,1988.

3Y THE COURT:

^^'

^Xj^^^^^-^^y

DISTRICT JUDGE

1/

J

:j

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to Robert W. Adkins and
Terry L. Christiansen, attorneys for defendant, P. 0. Box 660,
Coalville, Utah

84017, postage prepaid, this

/ 'f - '* day of

August, 1988.

' Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARL N. SMITH and DAWNA
LaVERNE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

R U L I N G

vs.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 85-CV-2D

Having fully considered the evidence received and the closing
arguments and memoranda of counsel, the court rules as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on their

theory of eminent domain, but are entitled to be compensated for
the damage to crops on the property used by Defendant.
2.

The use to which Defendant has put the property is

of such nature and duration that it is rendered unusable to the
Plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future.
Thus, the extent of damage to crops amounts to virtually a total
taking of the property by Defendant.

To allow Plaintiffs only

the minimal value of crops grown on that property for a number of
years which cannot now be determined would not be equitable.
3.

The value of such a taking can most accurately be

measured by determining the fair market value of the property and
deducting any residual value to the landowner after D^fei^fejatJ^
; ..i DISTRICT COURT DUChE.V
use has ended and the property restored.
w r r ^ . MTAM

J. i JL

^yi-

4.

Defendant's choice of the well-site was reasonable

and practical, and the dealings of Defendant's agents with
Plaintiffs were carried out in good faith.
5.

There being no evidence that the Defendant's use of

the property adversely affected the argicultural use of the
remainder of Plaintiffs' property, Plaintiffs are not entitled to
severance damages.
6.

The value of the property at the time the well-site

was constructed was $3,750.00 per acre.

The most comparable sales

used by the appraisers were the Cummings/Rule sale, at $3,530.00
per acre, and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at $3,300.00 per acre.

The

subject property is closer to a town than the cumparables, thus
justifying a higher ^/a'ue.

The property hat> some possible residual

value to Plaintiffs, which the court determines to be $375.00 per
acre.

The court finds that despite good faith effort by Defendant,

the 1.39 acre parcel has not been restored, and Plaintiffs' damages
continue.

Thus, Plaintiffs are awarded damages as follows:
4.76 acres @ $3,375.00 per acre
(3750 - 375) = $16,065.00
7.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest.

The court has been required to determine the value of the taking
of real estate for an uncertain period of time, and to fashion an
equitable award based thereon.

Thus, damages cannot be measured

as of a certain time, or according to certain figures.
DATED this %tl\

day of June, 19 88.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Gordon Am Madsen

i^

v£.

E£otit8*a,io. B *
THIS

w

AGREEMENT,

OIL AND GAS L E A S f / j g g S B i W ^ ^ ^ ™ ^

Entered into this the

29th

d

.

March

vo f

1

^J

19

6

6

.

H v r u m W. S m i t h and E m i l y M . S m i t h , h i s . w i l e j

Route 1, Box 45B.
Clearfield,

Utah

.hereinafter

mnd

called

lessor.

W a l t e r D u n c a n , P . Q , B o x 13 7 , D u r a n g o . C o l o r a d o
hereinafter caned lessee, doe. «un<,.:
One and m o r e - - - - - - - - - - 1. 00 & m o r e

2. That leaaor, tor »nd in consideration of the »um of
Dollars >*
>.
in hand paid, and of the covenants and agreement* hereinafter contained to be performed by the lessee, has this day granted and leased and hereby grants.
leaaes and leta unto the lessee for the purpose of mining and operating for and producing oil and gas, casinghead gas and casmghead gasoline, laying pipe
Unea. building tanks, storing oil. building powers, stations, telephone lines and other structures thereon to produce, save, take care of and manufacture all of

T"^) LI c h e s n e
such substances, and for housing and boarding employees, the following
Cauntf
U t a h
to-wit:

described tract

of land

In

— — — —

—

Township 1 South, Range 4 W e s t , USM:
Section 25: E | N W J S W J

—

ZTZ

- -

20. 00

In '*T—t~-i
Township
. Range
.
and containing
acre*, more or less
2. This lease shall remain In force for a term of ten (10> years and as long thereafter as oil. gas. casinghead gas, caslnghead gasoline or any of them
is produced.
3 The lessee shall deliver to the credit of the lessor as royalty, free of cost. In the pipe line to which lessee may connect us wells the equal one-eighth
part Of all oil produced and saved from the leased x>T^fiises. or at the lessee's option, may pay to the lessor for such one-eighth royulty the market price for
oil of like grade and gravity prevailing on the day such oil is run into the pipe lane, or into storage tanks.
4 The lessee shall pay lessor, as royalty, one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas. as such, for gus from wells where gas only is found, and
where not sold shall pay Fifty i*30.00> Dollars per annum as royalty from each such welt. s,nd while such royalty is so paid such well .shall be held to be a
producing well under paragraph numbered two hereof. The lessor to have gas free of charge from any gas well on the leased premi«cs for stove* and inside
lights in the principal dwelling house on said land by making his own connections with the well, the use of said gas to be at the lessors sole risk and expense The lessee shall pay to lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used by the lessee for the manufacture of gasoline or any other product, as royalty, one-eighth of the market value of such gas at the mouth of t h e veil. It said gas is sold by the lessee, then as. royalty one-eighth of the proceeds of
the sale thereof.
ft. If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or before one year from this date, this lease shall terminate
as to both parties, unlesa the lassee shall, on or before one year from this date, pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor's credit in the

State S a v i n g s and L o a n A s s o c i a t i o n

„u

#

Clearfield,

Its successors, which bank and its successors are the lessor's agent and shall continue as the depository

Utah
of any and/ all sums

gardless of changes of ownership in said land or in the oil and gas. or in the rentals to accrue thereunder, the sum of

H

payable

under

this

*L

lease, re

L

*»
— — <- — — — — » * * *
— « ' ' ' — * " " * — "" **" "
Z
Z Z». "" "" " n n i i ^ r , .« ^ ^ * W
_> which shall operate a<
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations for a period of one year. In like manner and upon like payments or
tenders, the commencement of drilling operations may be further deferred for like period .successively All payments or lenders may be made by check or
draft of lessee or any assignee thereof, mailed or delivered on or before the rental paying date.
Notwithstanding the death of the lessor, or his successor
in Interest, the payment or tender of rentals in the manner provided above shall be binding on the heirs, devisees executors, and admuii.itrutors of such person.
6. If at any time prior to the discovery of oil or gas on this land and during the term of this lease, the lessee shall drill a dry hole, or ho , n s. on this land.
this lease shall not terminate, provided operations for the drilling of a well shall be commenced within twelve months froun the expiration of t he last rental period
for which rental has been paid, or provided that within said period the lessee begins or rcs.mcs the payment of rentals m the manner and amn-int herein above
provided; und in this event the preceding paragraphs hereof governing the payment of r« r.tals and the manner and effect thereof ahull continue m force.
7. In case said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein, then the royalties and
rentals herein provided for shall be paid the said lessor only in the proportion which his interest bears to the whole and undivided fee.
8. The lessee shall have the right to use free of cost, gas. oil and water found on said land for its operations thereon, except water from the wells of the
lessor. When required by lessor, the lessee shall bury pipe lines below plow depth and shall pay for damage caused by its operations to crowing' crops on
said land. No well shall be drilled nearer than 200 feet to the house or barn now on said prerniy.es without written consent of the lessor. Lessee shall have the
right a: any time during or after the expiration of this lease to remove all machinery, fixtures. houses, buildings and other structures placed on said premises.
Including the right to draw and remove all casing.
9. If the estate of either party hereto Is assigned (and the privilege of assigning in whole or In part is expressly allowed*, the covenants hereof shall
extend to the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, but no change of ownership in the land or in the rentals or royalties shall be binding
on the lessee until after notice to the lessee and it has been furnished with the written transfer or assignment or a certified copy trureof. In the event this
lease shall be assigned as to a part or as to parts of the above described lands, and the h^'.ier or owner of any such part or parts shall fail or make default
In the payment of the proportionate part of the rent due from htm or them, such default .-.hall not operate to defeat or affect this lease tn so fur as it covers
a part or parts of said land upon which the said lessee or any assignee hereof shall make due payment of said rentals.
If at any time there be as many as
four parties entitled to rentals or royalties, lessee m«v withhold payments thereof unless and until all parties designate, in writing, in a recordable instrument to be filed with the lessee, a common agent to receive all payments due hereunder, and to execute divtMon and transfer orders on behalf of said parties,
and their respective successors In title.
10. Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to the land herein described and acrccs that the lessee, at its option, may pay and discharge
anj* taxes, mortgages, or other liens existing, levied, or assessed on or against the above described hinds and. in event it exercises such option, it shall be
subrogated to the rights of any holder or holders thereof and may reimburse itself by applying to the discharge of auv such mortgage, tax or or» _r Hen. any
royalty or rentals accruing hereunder.
11. Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary, it is expressly a creed that if lessee shall commence drilling operations at any time
while this lease is in force, this lease shall remain in force and its term shall continue so long as such operations are prosecuted and. if production results
therefrom, then as long as production continues.
12. If within the primary term of this lease production on the Tensed premises shall ce..se from any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided operations for the drilling of a well shall be commenced before or on the next ensuing rental paying date: or. provided les.-ee begins or resumes the payment of
rentals tn the manner and amount hereinbefore provided. If. after the expiration of the primary term of 'this lease, production on the leased premises shall
cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided lessee resumes operations for drilling a well «ithm sixty • 60 • cav$ from such cc.»>ution. and this
lease shall remajn in force during the prosecution of such operations and. if production re.-uit> therefrom, then as long as production continues.
13. If the leased premise's shall hereafter be owned in severalty or in separate tracts. :he premises, never: heless. 'hall be developed and operated as one
lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and thai! be divided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion
that the acreage owned by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage There shall be no obligation on the part of the lessee to offset wells
on separate tracts into which the land covered by this lease may be hereafter divided bv .ale. devise, or otherwise, or to furnish separate measuring or
receiving tanks. It is hereby agreed that, in the event this lease shall be assigned a> to a part or as to parts of the above described lands, and the holder
or owner of any such part or parts shall fail or make default in t h e payment of the proportionate part of the rent due from him or thnn. such default
shall not operate to defeat o»* affect this lease in so far as it covers a part or parts or s*-.d lti\d upon which the said lessee or anv assignee hereof shall
make due payment of said rentals. If at any time there be as many a s four parties, entitled to rentals or rovalties. lessee mav withhold pavtner.ts thereof unless and until all parties designate, in writing, tn a recordable instrument to be filed with the lessee, a common agent to receive all payments due hereunder.
and to execute division and transfer orders on behalf of said parties, and their respective successors in title.
.
H Lessee may at any time and from time to time surrender this lease as to any part or parts of the Icaacd premises by delivering or mailing & release
thereof to the lessor, or by placing a release thereof of record in the proper county.
15 This lease and all its terms, conditions, and stipulations shall extend to and be binding on all successors of said lessor or lessee.
£ 13. This lease shall not be terminated, in whole or In part, nor shall lessee be hsrld liable in damages, for failure to complv with the express or lmpneo. covenants hereof, if compliance therewith is prevented by. or If such failure is the result of. any Fedtral or State laws, executive orders, rules, or
recusations.
If. at the end of the primary term hereof, such term has not been extended bv production or drilling as in this *.ea.>*? provided, and lessee,
by reason of any of the above recited causes. Is unable to drill a well on the leased premises for oil or gas. the primarv term ^-id the rental provision
hereof shal. be extended automatically lrou\ year tv» year until the first anniversary hr.-eyf occurring ninety 90» or more days fcI'.oTing the removal of such
Relaying cause.
During any period that lessee is unable to produce and or market any products from the leased premises by rc;ion of anv of the above
recited causes, this lease shall remain in full force and effect.
1T
. Lessee Is hereby given the right at its option, at any time and from time to time, to pool or unitize all or anv part or part* of the above described land with other land. lease, or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, such pooling to be into units not exceeding the rr.ii.imum sl*«- tract on which
a a e u may be drilled under laws, rules, or regulations »n force at the time of such pooling or unitization
provided, however, that such units may exceed
sucn minimum by not more than ten acres if such excess is necessary in order to conform to ownership subdivisions or lease lir.»>
Lcs«-<«c shall exercise
said
option, as to each desired unit, by executing and recording an instrument identifying the unitized area
Anv well drilled or operations conducted on
m
£i'. P *J o f _ r a / , S L L C n U P U s h * 1 J o c considered a well drilled or operations conducted under this lease, and there shall be allocated to the portion of the
abo\e described
land
included
vn
any
such
unit
such
proportion
of
the
actual
production
frtm
all
well*
on
such
unit
as
lessor's
interest.
11 anv in such
TZ V««:.*f-a/!?JpuJ«» °r» * " " c r e * * e *>»>»*. *»*••'* t o t M l * ««tire acreage of such unit. And it .» understood and agreed that tne production so allocated shall
#£,H^2I ,.? dw f o r , . * U P«rPose». including the payment or delivery of royalty, to be the e:.:ire production from the portion of the above described land Included in such unit in the same manner as though produced from the above described Isr.i under the terms of this lease.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign the day and year first

above written.
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W.
MITH
l iSYTRI U
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>.S r>>\l»JcVv,

UTAH

EE O F -

ss.

A C K N O W L K D C i M K N T FOR I N D I V I D U A L (Kans., OkU., and Colo.)

STY OFf

B e f o r e m e , t h e undersisrncd, a N o t a r y P u b l i c , w i t h i n a n d f o r said c o u n t y and s t a t e , on t h i s
tally appeared
H.yruiTl W .
sS,7^, /
19. 6 6

_^L
S m i t h

E m i l y TvT. Smith r his w i f e
e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n t o be t h e i d e n t i c a l p e r s o n J I L w h o e x e c u t e d t h e w i t h i n a n d f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d t o m e
t h e y
p t o r u t c d t h e s a m e n«
their
fr»p a n d v o l u n t a r y a c t a n d deed f o r t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e ? t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h .
I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , I h a v e h e r e u n t o s e t m y h a n d a n d offic>a+-s*al t h e d a y a n d y e o j H a s t aUove w r i t t e n
ommission expires-

Notary "Public.

TE O F
NTY OF-

-} s s .

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T FOR I N D I V I D U A L ( K a n s ^ O k l a . . anS Colo.)

Before me, the undersigned, a N o t a r y Public, within and for said c o u n t y and state, on t h i s i*

19

e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to be t h e i d e n t i c a l p e r s o n

, personally appeared ,

w h o e x e c u t e d t h e w i t h i n a n d f o r e g o i n g : i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d to m e

- f r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y a c t a n d deed f o r t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e s t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h .
. e x e c u t e d the s a m e a s .
I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , I have hereunto s e t m y h a n d and official seal t h e day and y e a r last above w r i t t e n .
ommission expires..

N o t a r y Public.

TE OF

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T FOR CORPORATION

" > S3.

rNTY O F .
- d a y of-

On t h i s .

. , A. D., ll>

. before me, the undersigned, a N o t a r y Public

id f o r t h e c o u n t y and s t a t e a f o r e s a i d , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d
,
\ e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n t o b e t h e i d e n t i c a l p e r s o n w h o s i g n e d t h e n a m e of t h e m a k e r t h e r e o f t o t h e w i t h i n and f o r e g o i n g
-President and a c k n o w l e d g e d to m e t h a t .
.executed the same a s .
-free and
•ument a s i t s n t a r y a c t a n d d e e d , a n d a s t h e f r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y a c t a n d d e e d o f s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n , f o r t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e s t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h .
Given under m y hand and seal the day and y e a r last above written.
rommission e x p i r e s -

N o t a r y Public.
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W h e n s i g n a t u r e b y m a r k in K a n s a s , s a i d m a r k t o be w i t n e s s e d by at l e a s t o n e p e r s o n and a l s o
F o r a c k n o w l e d g m e n t by m a r k . us«- r e g u l a r K a n s a s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t .

\ T K OF
UNTV OF-

u
s

<r.

acknowledged.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T F O R I N D I V I D U A L ( K a n s . , Okla.. a n d C o l o . )

B e f o r e m e . t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , a N o t a r y Public, w i t h i n and f o r s a i d c o u n t y a n d s t a t e , on t h i s ,
of———

.

. li«

. personally appeared

me p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n t o be t h e identical p e r s o n
w h o e x e c u t e d t h e w i t h i n and f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d to
-executed the same a s .
f r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y net a n d deeti f o r t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e s t h e r e i n set f o r t h .
N V M T N h . S S VNHhRKOF, I h a v e h e r e u n t o set m y h a n d a n d offit ial s e a l t h e d a y a n d y e a r last a b o v e w r i t t e n .
commission expires.
N o t a r y Public.

CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT OPINION
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the
opinion of a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception to

this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art,
science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give
his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and which
is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion
and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it.

[You are not

bound, however, by such an opinion.] Give it the weight to which
you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may
reject it, [if in your judgment the reasons given for it are
unsound.]
*****

BAJI 33
Startin v. Madsen,

Utah

, 237 P.2d 834

CONSIDERATION OF INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE
If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea be
stated [has been stated] in vaying ways, no emphasis thereon is
intended, and none must be inferred by you.

For that reason, you

are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual
point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in
the light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance.
*****

BAJI-2
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.
1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287
Note:

Hillyard overruled in unrelated matter,
Harris v. Utah Transit, G71 P2d 217
(Utah 1983).

J2P36I26

INSTRUCTION NO,

During the course of this trial the State and
the defendants have introduced the testimony of expert
witnesses; these expert witnesses have expressed their
opinion as to the fair market value of the defendants1
property.

You are instructed that the factors considered b^

the experts are not, in themselves, direct evidence of the
fair market value of the land condemned, and such factors
may be considered by you, the jury, only for the purpose of
determining what weight, if any, you accorded to the
testimony of any of the expert witnesses in his ultimate
opinion as to the fair market value of the land in question
as of the date of taking.

J4P7I5

INSTRUCTION NO.

In weighing the testimony of each witness relating to comparable sales, you may consider whether the
parcels of land chosen are generally similar, particularly
as to factors having a bearing on value, namely: whether
they are in the same or different localities arid whether
similarly situated; whether the topography and pnysical
characteristics are similar; whether such other sales
were voluntary on the part of both buyer and seller; what
were the terms of payment and whether or not payments were
so extended so as to substantially affect price; how close
in time were such sales; and what adjustments were made by
the witness with respect to the differences between the
comparable sales and the subject property in arriving at
his opinion as to the fair market value of the defendants1
property.
Such sales form a basis for the opinion regarding
value of the witness relying thereon, but such sales, though
reasonably comparable, are not to be considered as the sole
test of fair market value herein.

